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I. INTRODUCTON: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH MINIMUM CAPITAL RATIOS FOR BANKS ON THE CONTINUING
BANKING REFORM DEBATE
The American banking system is today in the midst of a prolonged crisis,
its worst since the Great Depression. Legislative efforts to bring about regulato-
ry reform of the industry have centered on the need to avoid further massive
losses to the deposit insurance fund and the need to restore competitiveness to
the nation's system of 13,000 banks.
Some of the same problems that have plagued the U.S. banking industry
recently-including severe competition among banks and from nonbanking
financial products-have increased pressure on banks operating internationally
for some time. The increase in transnational banking activity in the past two
decades' and the pressures of severe competition2 have led to mechanisms to
1. Some of the changes associated with the internationalization of banking are due to technological
advances that have facilitated rapid cross-border capital transfers. One concern is that financial instability
in one country could quickly infect the banking industry worldwide. See Grace W. Chang, Note, The
Proposed Risk-Based Capital Framework: A Model of International Banking Cooperation?, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 777, 780 (1988).
2. In the past decade, the same technological advances that have increased the transnational movement
of funds have reduced banks' comparative advantage in access to financial information. See infra note 46
and accompanying text. Thus, the securitization of lending-bundling loans into a ratable collateral pool
backing a securities issue-has also accompanied the "disintermediation" of international lending away from
banks. Recent Innovations in International Banking, 26 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 209, 210 (1986). For a
discussion of why banks have historically been able to rely upon some borrowers' willingness to pay interest
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coordinate regulation of banks at the international level.3 Efforts among nation-
al regulatory authorities to address problems associated with stress4 on the
international banking industry in one key area---capital adequacy regula-
tion-have now influenced domestic banking reform initiatives in the United
States.
On the international front, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations
and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee) of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS)5 unveiled in December 1987 a preliminary agreement by the
central bank governors of twelve countries for a risk-based capital framework
that set minimum capital-to-assets ratios for banks operating internationally.6
As it stands, this agreement (the Basle standard) represents an important first
step in ensuring the soundness of the banking industry and a common interna-
tional basis for regulation.7
In the United States, the Basle minimum capital ratios themselves were
incorporated into federal banking regulations two years ago and thus apply to
all American banks and bank holding companies.8 However, early in 1991,
both the Treasury Department and backers of the Senate banking bill, S. 543,
took the further key step of adopting the capital adequacy principles of the
Basle standard as the basis for broad banking reform proposals. Elements of
these proposals were incorporated into the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance
Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act (Comprehensive Reform Act), under
which capital adequacy will become a sufficient criterion for government
intervention in troubled institutions.' Significantly, the Treasury had put forth
rates higher than the return on securities of equivalent risk, see Eugene Fama, What's Different About
Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 30, 38-39 (1985). In short, the demand for "tradable assets has
encouraged the growth of securities markets at the expense of direct bank lending." Innovation in Interna-
tional Banking, 26 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL 225, 228 (1986); see also Jeffrey Bardos, The Risk-based
Capital Agreement: A Further Step Towards Policy Convergence, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REv.,
Winter 1987-88, at 26.
3. Nations sought policy convergence to ensure that all institutions are caught within the supervisory
net, to eliminate regulatory drift toward the lowest common denominator, to remove incentives for banks
to shift operations to countries with lax supervision, and to ensure competitive equity among international
banks. Maximilian J.B. Hall, The BIS Capital Adequacy "Rules": A Critique, 169 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL
LAVoRO Q. REV. 207 (1989).
4. See generally The Many Facades of BCCI, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 81 (recounting classic
failure of international coordination of bank supervision).
5. See infra note 49.
6. Bankfor International SettlementsProposalsforinternational Convergence ofCapital Measurement
and Capital Standards (Dec. 1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 530 (1988) [hereinafter Basle Committee
Proposal].
7. The goal, according to the BIS, was "to replace the diversity of existing national regulations for
measuring capital adequacy... [with] a single internationally accepted standard and, by this means, to help
strengthen the soundness of the international banking system as well as to remove a source of competitive
inequality between banks arising from differences in regulation." Activities of the Bank, in BANK FOR INT'L
SmrrLEmNTS, 59TH ANNUAL REPORT (1989).
8. The Basle standard was adopted by the Federal Reserve on March 15, 1989 at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-
.127 & app. A-B (1991); 12 C.F.R. 160-88 app. A-B (1991).
9. Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act, Pub. L No. 102-242 (1991).
As a practical matter, the most important aspect of this legislation was the section 101 recapitalization of
the Bank Insurance Fund. Id. For the original Bush administration proposals, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF
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in its original proposal a blueprint for the most far-reaching banking reform,
which included capital-based regulation, in more than half a century; the
original S. 543 featured parallel, though less extensive, reforms.
The need to reduce federal deposit insurance system'0 losses" has been
the impetus behind capital-based regulatory provisions of the Comprehensive
Reform Act, which will reduce the incentives for banks to take lending risks.
Controlling risk-taking by banks is essential given that recent large bank
failures12 have left the deposit insurance fund in its worst state since its cre-
ation sixty years ago.' 3 Indeed, the legacy of the thrift crisis and the costs it
has imposed upon the taxpayer provided great support for enactment of manda-
tory supervisory restrictions based upon a bank's capital position.
Some policy analysts have expressed reservations about the effectiveness
of capital-based regulation-which entails harsh regulatory sanctions, including
dividend and growth restrictions and forced conservatorship-because many
seemingly well-capitalized banks failed or reorganized during recent years, 14
including several major Texas institutions. 5 What these critics have over-
looked is that weak supervision has been a problem generally;16 capital-based
THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETI-
TIVE BANKS 12-15 (1991) [hereinafter MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM]. See also U.S. Plans Radical
Overhaul ofBanks, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1. For discussion of the Treasury plan and original S. 543,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), see infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. The Act has already been
criticized for failing to take further steps to restructure the banking industry. See, e.g., Banking Reform in
the Dirt, ECONOMiST, Nov. 9, 1991, at 91; The Cooks Spoil the Broth, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1991, at 75.
Although improving the competitiveness of U.S. banks was a principal aim of the Treasury plan, it met
resistance from small banks who feared growing market concentration toward a European model. Martin
Dickson, Financial Sector Gives Package a Mixed Welcome, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at 6.
10. Deposit insurance was introduced as a result of the banking disasters of the 1930's. More than 5000
U.S. banks failed between 1930 and 1932, and 4000 failed the following year. Depositor losses totaled
almost $800 million in 1932 dollars. Federal Reserve discount window lending was ineffective both at
stemming the crisis and at preventing a dramatic contraction of the money supply. See MODERNIZING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 1. This experience has silenced those who have argued that so long
as there is a lender of last resort a deposit insurance scheme is unnecessary. R. Alton Gilbert, Market
Discipline of Bank Risk: Theory and Evidence, 72 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LouIs REV. 3, 5 (1990).
11. Recently, the federal deposit insurance fund has been threatened with insolvency. US. Bank Fund
Said to Require $15 Billion Cash, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 27-28, 1991, at 13.
12. The takeover of the three banking companies that Bank of New England controlled became the
third largest government bank rescue in history and was expected to cost about $2.7 billion. New England
Bank Gets Buyout Deal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24, 1991, at 9; Ron Suskind & Kenneth H. Bacon,
FleetiNorstar, KKR Win Bank of New England Bidding, WALL ST. I. EUR., Apr. 24, 1991, at 9.
13. Stephen Labaton, US. Bank Insurance: A $4 Billion Hole?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 25, 1991,
at 9.
14. See Testimony of Robert E. Litan, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings
Institution, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the Need for Early
Intervention in the Case of Troubled Banks, March 12,1991, at 1 [hereinafter Litan Testimony] (unpublished
testimony, on file with author).
15. MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 7.
16. For example, the Federal Reserve has decided to expand its authority to regulate foreign banks
operating in the United States in response to loopholes that permitted the development of a relationship
between the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and the Washington-based First American
Bankshares. BCCI was indicted on money-laundering charges in 1988. Jim McGee, Fed Focuses on Foreign
Banks in US., INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 11, 1991, at 14.
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regulation will remove at least one dimension of regulatory discretion. 17 The
Treasury Department's declaration that capital is "the single most powerful tool
to make banks safer" reflects this theory that the Basle minimum capital ratios
can be used in conjunction with regulatory sanctions to punish reckless
banks.18 Unfortunately, other ills of the banking industry will remain.
Support for the capital adequacy proposals came from policymakers seeking
to devise ways to increase the international competitiveness of American
commercial banks while ensuring that these institutions would not fund prospec-
tive nonbanking activities with insured deposits.' 9 Current thinking is that
wide-scale deposit insurance-and de facto protection of all deposits-is
inconsistent with a healthy industry.' The availability of the deposit insurance
fund to protect deposits of less than $100,000 encourages bank managers to
make risky investments.2' In this respect, capital-based regulation can be
understood as a means of addressing regulatory capture by the banking indus-
try.' But the present fascination with capital adequacy has meant that other
structural deficiencies in the U.S. industry, such as interstate branching restric-
tions, have not received adequate attention. 3
Part I of this Note provides a general discussion of the role of capital in
banking decisions. Part I covers the development of the Basle standard, its
legal status, its anticompetitive implications, and its shortcomings as a method
of risk assessment. Part IV evaluates the ability of capital-based regulation to
address problems in the U.S. banking system.
17. One appeal of capital-based regulation is that it appears to hold the promise of breaking a cycle
of regulation, financial industry avoidance and circumvention of regulation, and reregulation. See Edward
J. Kane, Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 332-33 (1988).
Capital-based regulation also promises to reduce the time lag between bank distress and FDIC action, which
has hidden the scope of industry problems. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 2 n.6.
18. New research has supported the relationship between capital adequacy and bank health. MODERNIZ-
ING THE FiNANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 12.
19. Louis Uchitelle, Shifting the Risk in U.S. Banking, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 22, 1991, at 11.
20. Augmenting the role of capital is one means of increasing market discipline of bank activity. For
others, see Gilbert, supra note 10.
21. When regulators permit insolvent institutions to remain in business, they only exacerbate this
problem. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 4.
22. George J. Benston, International Bank Capital Standards 4 (Aug. 1989) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the Joint Universities Conference on Regulating Commercial Banks, Canberra, on file with
author). In the banking context, some have identified a "nondisclosure regime" in the federal regulatory
oversight of bank lending risks. Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating
Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1986). Boro sees confidence in the banking system as "an
intangible good that depositors demand and banks [supply]"--a mode of analysis which, he argues, is useful
for understanding runs on banks and why regulators seek to avoid runs at all costs. Id. at 446.
Significantly, capital-based regulation has not solved the most important banking problems in the
United States today, which include finding ways for banks to enter securities and insurance activities that
have been prohibited to them. Although capital-based regulation will, of course, improve the bank capital
levels, the major structural difficulties facing the industry will continue because of the willingness of
legislators to sidestep politically difficult issues (such as removing barriers to the securities industry) by
considering only reforms based upon relatively uncontroversial regulatory principles.
23. The Treasury proposal would have allowed nationwide branch networks within three years, subject
to state limitations. See London Takes the Sanguine View, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at 24.
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II. THE KEY ROLE OF CAPITAL IN THE BANK BALANCE SHEET
Capital represents the amount and type of financial resources of a particular
institution.' The bank regulator ensures that, over time, a bank can sustain
extraordinary losses and remain solventa 5 Government efforts to regulate bank
capital reflect the tension between the need for prudential risk management and
the need to produce an acceptable return for investors.26 Because regulatory
authorities seek to minimize bank insolvency, capital requirements tend to be
based upon a worst case or bad times projection.27 There are several forms
of capital that provide the necessary cushion for a bank in times of financial
crisis.28
Although the Basle standard relates capital to assets, it has been suggested
that capital should relate to the liability side of the balance sheet because
deposits represent the part of a bank's financial condition with the greatest
potential volatility.29 The risk involved in banking is that of not being able
to meet withdrawals through asset sales. The true gauge of correct capitalization
is the extent to which liabilities match assets: the closer the match, the less
capital needed.3°
24. Capital is in general a form of protection of repayments and a safeguard against distribution of
assets, money, or shares in a way that compromises the interests of creditors (and nonparticipating
shareholders) and/or may render the enterprise insolvent. The legal capital structure of an enterprise parallels
the contractual and legal rights and order of priority of distribution for different classes of shareholders upon
liquidation. For a discussion, see Joseph . Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory
Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 Otlo ST. L.. 1299, 1304-05 (1989).
25. From the perspective of debtholders, capital cushions them from unexpected losses. Debtholders
gain protection from the equity cushion that must be exhausted before firm losses eat into their principal.
Shareholders, in theory, want to keep their capital-to-assets ratios lower rather than higher because, given
constant earnings, a bank's return on equity increases as capital decreases.
The relative amounts of debt and equity comprising capital are, of course, important from bankruptcy
and agency perspectives as well. Institutions with higher debt levels are more likely to be forced into
bankruptcy through the contractual rights of debtholders. On the other hand, these same institutions are more
inclined to engage in risky activities because equity holders gain the residual benefit of such ventures while
debtholders assume all of the risk. Finance theory assumes that the cost of capital does not depend upon
relative amounts of debt and equity. But these agency problems associated with relatively higher debt levels
actually do affect the cost of capital.
Critics of the Basle definition of capital have argued for a greater role for subordinated debt on the
ground that holders of this instrument have no incentive to see greater institutional risk-taking. Banks' need
to go to the market to sell their debt imposes discipline, as does the debtholders' knowledge that they will
not be able to withdraw their funds immediately. See Benston, supra note 22, at 16-18.
26. See generally Norton, supra note 24, at 1304-05.
27. In theory, capital requirements operate to limit growth, hinder dividend payments, and lead banks
to seek greater returns through higher risk investments. But the U.S. experience demonstrates that, in
practice, poorly capitalized institutions tend to have dispositive credit losses. See infra notes 127-29 and
accompanying text.
28. Nonredeemable common stock that has no contractual right to bank earnings provides the best form
of capital. Other forms, such as preferred stock, can limit the flexibility of management if a bank's financial
position begins to deteriorate. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftmanship, 42 CAL.
L. REV. 243, 253-57 (1954).
29. Norton, supra note 24, at 1309.
30. Another approach to regulating capital might be to focus upon concentrations of large loan
exposures. Id. at 1309-10.
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Regardless of the form it takes, bank capital performs a key function of
enhancing the security of bank liabilities and bolstering public confidence in
the safety and soundness of the industry. In an environment of deposit insur-
ance, capital operates in much the same way as an insurance deductible, which
shields the insurance fund from initial losses and counters the "moral hazard"
of risk-taking associated with the insurance safety net.31 In the United States,
the presence of the deposit insurance safety net seems to have permitted banks
to run down their capital levels.32 Indeed, financial institutions covered implic-
itly or explicitly by the government insurance safety net have much lower
capitalization than those without such backing, such as insurance companies,
securities brokers/dealers, and short-term credit companies.33
Strong capitalization will result in the following tangible benefits for the
banking industry:34 (1) Reducing incentives for banks to take excessive risks:
Low bank capitalization in a deposit insurance environment exacerbates the
moral hazard dilemma. Banks and their owners, who have relatively little at
stake, will be tempted to gamble with insured funds in order to increase their
return on equity. Such institutions can obtain easy access to deposits by offering
slightly above-market-rate interest on large deposits. Whereas risky credits that
turn bad ultimately result in few losses for the thinly capitalized bank and its
owners, risky credits that perform offer a high return and improve the bank's
situation. (Qualitative evaluations of bank capital focus upon credit risk3 as
the root of most problems associated with troubled banks and high losses.36)
(2) Placing a buffer in front of the taxpayer in an environment of deposit insur-
ance: In the case of bank failure, losses that bank capital can absorb preserve
the deposit insurance fund. (3) Lessening misallocation of credit: The tempta-
31. See William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements,
49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1365, 1381 (1989).
32. Over the last 150 years, the ratio of aggregate capital to total assets in the banking system has
declined from a high of about 50% to current levels well below 10%. Although some of this decline in
capitalization can no doubt be attributed to the increasing efficiency of the industry, the perception of
government guarantees presumably allows banks to operate with a small capital buffer MODERNIZING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 12.
33. Id. The low capitalization of banks derives in part from the fact that the bulk of their assets do
not fluctuate in value-so that assets easily equal liabilities under normal conditions. Capital in a financial
institution is like an inventory that absorbs net profit or loss. In institutions that hold marketable assets, the
net profit in any accounting period fluctuates-merely because asset values fluctuate, generating paper profits
or losses. Banks, however, hold mostly nonmarketable assets, which should be valued, most of the time,
at face value. Thus, in the case of banks, the inventory that absorbs fluctuations in net accounting profits
often can be much smaller proportionally than that for other financial institutions.
34. The following six points are outlined in id. at 13.
35. U.S. regulators have observed that even when bank difficulties have been traced to other factors,
such as mismanagement or macroeconomic trends, the outcome has nonetheless been credit losses. As a
result, noncredit portfolio risks such as trading risks are not addressed in quantitative capital standards, but
through the bank examination process. Gary Haberman, CapitalRequirements of Commercial andInvestment
Banks: Contrasts in Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1987, at 1, 8.
36. Credit risk considerations have dominated the evolution of capital standards in the United States
because banks deal with customers with a range of financial strength and because marginal credit losses
are viewed as acceptable business costs. Id.
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tion for owners and managers of a poorly capitalized bank to seek risky,
high-return assets can lead to a misallocation of resources toward risky invest-
ments. The result can be an oversupply of funds available for high-risk ventures
but, in turn, an artificially low supply of capital for less risky loans, leading
to higher interest rates for these activities 7 (4) Avoiding credit crunches: In
an economic downturn, a well-capitalized bank will probably not have to
contract its asset base in the face of nonperforming loans. Rather, such a bank
will probably be able to absorb any losses and to maintain its previous lending
levels. (5) Increasing long-term competitiveness: Capital also gives banks the
financial flexibility to respond to the industry environment. Moreover, and
somewhat counterintuitively, banks with higher capital ratios have tended to
enjoy a higher return on equity.38 Of course, the direction of causation, in
some cases, is likely to be such that strong performance by an institution
enhances capitalization.39 (6) Lowering the probability of bank failure: Finally,
by definition, adequate capital guards against bank failure.'
Given the role of capital in the bank balance sheet, regulation of bank
capital ratios at both the domestic and international level is a means of ensuring
bank health. The most significant regulatory initiatives were first taken at the
international level; the resulting capital standards have been adopted in the
United States and have broadly influenced U.S. banking reform efforts.
III. THE BASLE STANDARD OF MINIMuM CAPITAL RATIOS
The greatest significance of the Basle standard of minimum capital ratios
in the United States, as will be discussed in Part IV, is that failure to meet the
standard has become a criterion for broader regulation of and supervisory
intervention into the activities of American institutions.
Section A explains how the Basle standard was developed to address
supervisory gaps in the capital adequacy regulation of internationally active
commercial banks. Section B discusses the soundness and stability and "com-
petitive equality" goals, the legal operation of the Basle standard, and how it
may restrict access to the industry. Section B also considers the theoretical
soundness and practical worth of the Basle standard's risk measurement scheme,
37. If enough weak banks follow these trends, they may compel even strong institutions to compete
on these terms, and skewed interestrates will characterize the lending market. MODERNZING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTI, supra note 9, at 13.
38. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
39. Conversely, if a lender makes bad loans, losses will diminish capital, although it may appear that
low capitalization is inducing poor performance.
40. Nevertheless, capital cannot impose further burdens upon a bank in times of financial stress. For
example, dividend payments on stockholders' equity can be suspended when the bank's capital is under
pressure. Haberman, supra note 35, at 7.
15311992]
The Yale Law Journal
given (1) that risks are always appraised independently of actual lending and
(2) that risks should be appraised a priori rather than from past experience.41
A. Development of the Basle Standard
1. Increased Risks for Banks Operating Internationally
In a closed or domestic banking system, institutions must manage their flow
of assets in such a way that they can meet depositor calls. This job may be
easier for institutions in a system in which there is a close association between
banks and central authorities. But, in any case, participation in international
activities can introduce a significant source of instability into the operations of
the typical institution. The institution may not enjoy the recognition internation-
ally that it does within the domestic economy and may not have a stable role.
In turn, the stability of funding for its international business may be easily
threatened. In short, liquidity problems for a particular institution can arise
abroad despite an apparently secure position at home.
The danger in international banking in the mid-1980's centered on the
implications of a shift from bank to bond market finance, the development of
instruments that escaped the supervisory net, and the problem of risk assessment
in the face of new technologies. Combined, these developments presented cause
for concern about loan asset quality and the general state of bank portfolios.
The problem was that since the 1970's, as banks increased their role interna-
tionally, domestic supervision of banks had not kept pace with banks' expanded
activities. National supervisory authorities faced increasingly complex banking
structures and differences in domestic regulatory philosophies. Moreover, each
of these national authorities was largely reluctant to change its regulatory
policies lest it erode any competitive advantage of its own banking industries.
In the past decade, the severe competitive pressures of the international
banking business have affected both the capitalization and the liquidity of
banks 2 For example, to manage their liquidity, banks have increased their
reliance upon volatile purchased funds in place of short-term liquid assets.
Moreover, because banks' corporate clients have increasingly raised money in
41. Within portfolio finance theory, the supplanting of the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) by
the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) is based upon this need for an expectational, ex ante model rather than
one that, like the CAPM, can only be written in ex post, realized terms. The APT is a multifactor equilibri-
um pricing model that makes a statement about the relationship between expected returns of assets and the
common features of those assets. The CAPM's deficiency is that it does not describe investor behavior in
the marketplace and isolates the market as the sole source of risk. See generally Phillip H. Dybvig &
Stephen A. Ross, Yes, The APT Is Testable, 40 1. FiN. 1173, 1174-77, 1180-82 (1985).
The Basle standard is based upon risk assessment rules that are largely mechanical and rely upon the
record of the past-the Committee's sense of the historical quality of certain types of assets, such as that
of residential mortgages in most member countries. See Basle Committee Proposal, supra note 6, at 539.
42. Brian Quinn, The Management of Liquidity, Address Before the SEANZA Forum of Banking
Supervisors, Sydney (Mar. 23, 1988), in 28 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 236, 237 (1988).
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capital markets, rather than from bank loans, banks have become more willing
to enter into large commitments in order to retain their best customers, thus
reducing their portfolio diversification. Finally, as the securitization of bank
assets has increased, banks' role as controlled risk takers has waned as their
role as risk managers has grown. 3
The rate of global integration, structural change, and domestic deregulation
in the international financial system accelerated dramatically in the 1980's.
First, an increasing proportion of credit flows began to assume a marketable
form. 4 In addition, the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates during
the 1970's and 1980's created a demand for hedging instruments, which have
not appeared, for the most part, on bank balance sheets: hence, regulatory
concern about banks' off-balance sheet risk increased.45
Although the global integration of financial markets came about as a result
of deregulation in the 1980's, technological advances lowered the cost of
transactions in terms of both providing access to information and linking
exchanges. Problems arose because many of the new instruments were not
caught within the supervisory net of national regulation.46
2. Early Work of the Basle Committee to Promote Joint Supervision
Against this backdrop, a watershed event occurred. In 1974, one of the
largest privately owned German banks, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt, which had
assets of about $900 million, collapsed. This event heightened concern, which
had existed since the development of Euromarkets in the early 1960's, over the
vulnerability of a system in which interbank lending predominated. 7 The
43. Id.
44. RecentInnovations in InternationalBankingsupra note 2, at209-10; see also M.K. Lewis, Off-Bal-
ance Sheet Activities and Financial Innovation in Banking, 167 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. REV.
387-410 (1988).
45. Financial futures were introduced in the mnid-1970's. Eurodollar interest-rate futures have been a
more recent development and have featured substantial bank participation. Interest-rate and currency swaps,
developed in 1981 in connection with capital market transactions, were soon traded in their own right-to
a level of $200 billion in 1985. Recent Innovations in International Banking, supra note 2, at 209-10.
46. Moreover, the complexity of these instruments increased the difficulty of risk measurement. By
1986, it was clear that the shift to marketable assets had implications for the quality of bank portfolios and
long-term credit decisions. An immediate concern of central authorities such as the Bank of England was
how to supervise and manage risk when the nature of that risk was changing with the introduction of new
technologies and financial instruments. Innovation in International Banking, Speech of the Governor at the
London International Capital Markets Conference (May 7,1986), in 26 BANK OF ENG. Q. BuLL. 225 (1986).
Competition in the international banking business also drove innovation. Fierce competition among
firms offering similar products has characterized the industry. Although the major loci of activity are New
York and London, institutions from all major financial centers participate. In many instances, banks and
securities firms have competed with analogous products. Thus, the bargaining power of bank clients, both
borrowers and investors, is high, and innovation for banks is a means of obtaining a competitive advantage.
47. See Norton, supra note 24, at 1336. By June 1974, Herstatt had incurred massive losses from
foreign exchange trading and approached the Bundesbank for assistance. Reorganization attempts failed as
poor bank records hindered efforts to ascertain quickly the full extent of Herstatt's losses-which eventually
mounted to almost $500 million. Herstatt was closed on June 26, 1974-as trading continued in New
York-leaving some foreign banks exposed.
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episode, along with other banking crises, strengthened the hands of those who
wished to see strong international banking supervision. In September of that
year, the central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries met in
Basle, Switzerland, and formally established a framework to ensure the long-
term health of the international banking system under the auspices of the Basle
Committee of the Bank for International Settlements.4 9
In December 1975, the Committee issued the Basle Concordat (Concordat),
which established guidelines for banks operating in more than one country. The
Concordat recognizes the primary responsibility of host country authorities for
bank supervision but acknowledges the implicit duty of parent country authori-
ties to ensure the solvency and liquidity of the foreign branches of their nation-
als.50 The preeminent goal of the Concordat is to eliminate supervisory gaps
and to emphasize that banking authorities should exercise supervisory responsi-
bility"1 rather than simply assuming the role of a lender of last resort.
3. U.S. Role in Developing the Basle Standard
Regulatory interest in capital adequacy surfaced in the United States after
the banking crisis of the 1930's but has developed into a policy imperative only
in the past decade.52 Congress recognized in the early 1980's that the money
center banks held Latin American debt which, if assigned market value, reflect-
ed potential losses that the capital bases of these banks could not absorb. In
November 1983, Congress passed the International Lending Supervision Act
(ILSA) in response to the increase in sovereign debt exposure of U.S. institu-
tions; the statute required each bank regulatory agency to establish minimum
capital ratios for institutions within its jurisdiction and called for regulators to
48. Hall, supra note 3, at 208. The Basle Committee, also called the Cooke Committee, after its
chairman, NV. Peter Cooke of the Bank of England, consists of representatives of central bank supervisory
authorities from Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the G-10 countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For discussion of the
institutional framework of the Basle Committee, see Chang, supra note 1, at 781-83. The Basle Committee's
central aim has been to encourage convergence in bank supervisory practices, although its conclusions do
not have legal force. The legal significance of the Committee's actions is the potential for law generation
within the countries of the Committee's member banking authorities.
49. The BIS was established in 1930 in Basle. Like the Basle Committee, the BIS has been a forum
for supervisory authorities to explore cooperation, an institution to formulate regulatory guidelines, and a
vehicle for eliminating risk in international banking. It is also an international financial institution. BIS
members include the G-10 countries plus Albania, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, and
Turkey. Chang, supra note 1, at 777 n.4, 781 n.28.
50. Id. at781 n.31; see also W. Peter Cooke, Developments in Co-operation Among Banking Superviso-
ry Authorities, 3 J. COM. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 253, 256 (1981).
51. The Concordat was revised in 1983 to improve joint supervision between parent and host authori-
ties. The revised Concordat, which was widely publicized and distributed, incorporates the principle of parent
country authority over all branches and subsidiaries within a single banking entity-consolidated supervision.
Chang, supra note 1, at 781 n.31.
52. Norton, supra note 24, at 1317, 1324-26.
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consult with their counterparts in other nations on relevant issues.53 Thus, the
ILSA was an initial catalyst for international policy convergence and a vehicle
for giving capital adequacy credence as a regulatory imperative.? The Federal
Reserve later promulgated uniform capital rules in 1985, in part to address
banks' growing off-balance-sheet exposures.'
In 1986, the Bank of England entered discussions on convergence of capital
standards with the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-outside of
the Basle Committee framework 6 The most important step the Bank of
England achieved was agreement with U.S. regulators on the establishment of
the minimum capital ratio for "internationally active" banks.57 The accord
published on January 8, 1987 never came into effect but was a stimulus for
prompt settlement within the Basle Committee, encouraging cooperation from
reluctant countries, such as Japan, as well as others in Europe.58
In February 1987, the Federal Reserve published for comment a proposed
framework, based on the accord, for evaluating commercial bank and bank
holding company capital sufficiency that addressed both on- and off-balance
sheet risks9 and which would provide a relatively accurate picture of the risk
exposure of the individual bank.60 The proposal created a capital-to-assets ratio
to relate a banking institution's capital to its weighted risk assets.6
The key to risk-based requirements is lower risk weights for lower risk
assets-an approach the Bank of England, the main player in both the
U.S.-U.K. and Basle standardization efforts, had applied since 1980.62 The risk
53. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907(a)(1)(b) (1989).
54. Cf. Lyle B.Vander Schaaf, The International Lending Supervision Act of1983: Has itHadAn Effect
on the Latin American Debt Crisis?, 2 AM. U. I. INT'L L. & POL'Y 689, 705 n.89 (1987) (citing criticism
of competitive inequality in international capital standards).
55. Bardos, supra note 2, at 26-27.
56. See Convergence of Capital Adequacy in the UK and US, 27 BANK OF ENG. Q. BuLL. 85, 86
(1987).
57. The Federal Reserve was familiar with the Bank of England's risk-based capital approach and had,
in fact, considered adopting a form of it in 1986. Hall, supra note 3, at 208; Norton, supra note 24, at 1342.
58. Agreed Proposal of the United States Federal Banking Supervisory Authorities and the Bank of
England on Primary Capital and Capital Adequacy Assessment, 27 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 87 (1987);
see also Convergence of Capital Standards and the Lessons of the Market Crash, Speech of the Governor
to the Overseas Bankers' Club (Feb. 1, 1988), in 28 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 220 (1988). The immediate
problem for reaching agreement with the Japanese was that Japan counted a higher percentage of hidden
reserves-unrealized gains in securities positions-as capital. Bardos, supra note 2, at 28, 29; see also infra
text accompanying notes 85-86.
59. 52 Fed. Reg. 5119 (1987) (proposed Feb. 19, 1987); see also U.S. & Britain Propose a Rule on
Bank Capital, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1987, at 3.
60. Haberman, supra note 35, at 9 app.
61. The plan dictated that primary capital be "freely available to absorb current losses while permitting
an organization to function as a going concern." Capital was divided into two categories: base (core) primary
capital and limited primary capital, the latter being limited to 50% of the former. The plan defined base
primary capital funds to include common stockholders' equity, general reserves for unindemnified losses,
and minority interests in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Capital instruments qualifying
as limited primary capital included perpetual preferred stock, limited-life preferred stock with an original
maturity of at least 25 years, and certain subordinated debt. Id.
62. For a general discussion of the risk-weighting system, see Lovett, supra note 31, at 1383-86.
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weighting of various groups of assets reflects credit risk considerations more
than factors of liquidity or interest-rate risk. In so doing, risk weighting takes
into account classes of obligors, maturities of assets, and types of collateraliza-
tion.63 The proposed credit conversion ratio allows a credit-risk-based assess-
ment of off-balance sheet exposure.64
In the fall of 1987, the Basle Committee reached preliminary agreement
on the minimum standard for risk-based capital. In December 1987, the Com-
mittee issued its consultative paper, Proposals for International Convergence
of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards (Basle proposal). 5 The
framework outlined was similar to that of the U.S.-U.K. accord.66 However,
the Basle proposal provides that, after a transition period, core capital will
consist primarily of common stockholders' equity; loan loss reserves count as
secondary capital.67 Certain intangible assets other than goodwill will not be
deducted from capital.68 Subordinated debt is included in tier-two capital, up
to fifty percent of core capital.
In July 1988, the central bank governors of the G-10 countries endorsed
the system of risk-based capital guidelines for banking organizations under their
jurisdictions.6 9 The Basle accord is in its phase-in period-with a capital target
63. Haberman, supra note 35, at 10.
A summary of U.S. risk weights for on-balance sheet assets under the U.S.-U.K. accord follows: 0%:
cash, domestic and foreign; 10% : short-term (one-year or less) claims upon the U.S. government and its
agencies; 25%: cash items in collection, short-term claims on domestic and foreign banks, long-term claims
on and guarantees of the U.S. government, claims including repurchase agreements, collateralized by cash
or U.S. government or agency debt, local currency claims on foreign governments to the extent that the
bank has local currency liabilities; 50% : claims on or collateralized by U.S. government-sponsored agencies,
municipal bonds that are general debt obligations; 100% : claims on private entities and individuals, claims
on foreign governments that involve transfer risk. Id.
64. Id. A summary of the conversion factors for off-balance sheet exposures follows: 100% : direct
credit substitutions including financial guarantees and standby letters of credit, repurchase agreements and
other asset sales with recourse, if not already included on the balance sheet; 50% : trade-related contingen-
cies including commercial letters of credit and performance bonds, other commitments with original maturity
over five years, including revolving underwriting facilities; 25% : other commitments with original maturity
of one to five years; 10% : other commitments with original maturities of one year or less (swaps, over-the-
counter options, and other difference contracts would be treated separately).
65. See Hall, supra note 3, at 209. Basle standard capital elements for Tier 1 include (a) ordinary
common stuck and (b) disclosed reserves; those for Tier 2 include (a) undisclosed reserves, (b) asset revalua-
tion reserves, (c) general provisions/loan loss reserves, and (d) hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments. Id.
at 223.
66. Like the U.S.-U.K. accord, the Basle Proposal distinguishes between core and secondary capital,
establishes broad risk-weight categories, provides risk assessment for off-balance sheet items, and recognizes
international capital standards as a step in overall policy convergence. Basle Committee Proposal, supra
note 6, at 530-39.
67. Id. at 532-35. For discussion of the debate over instruments comprising secondary capital, see Hall,
supra note 3, at 211-14. The Basle Proposal also features a different risk-weighting structure. Domestic
government securities maturing within 90 days receive a zero risk weighting. All other domestic government
and agency obligations receive a 10% risk weighting. Short-term bank claims receive a 20% risk weighting,
as do government-sponsored agency securities, securities of local governments, commercial letters of credit,
and assets backed by domestic depository institutions.
68. Basle Committee Proposal, supra note 6, at 535-36. Goodwill is only an amortized estimate of
future benefits, which a firm developing serious problems may never realize.
69. Convergence of Capital Standards and the Lessons of the Market Crash, supra note 58.
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of 7.25% of assets (3.25% in core capital)-and will be in effect on December
31, 1992. At that time, the minimum capital-to-assets ratio will be 4.0% for
core capital and 8.0% for total capital.
B. Problems with the Basle Capital Adequacy Regime
1. The Inconsistency of the Basle Program with Its Stated Purposes
The Basle Committee has declared that the purpose of the capital adequacy
standard is (1) to strengthen the international banking industry while (2) provid-
ing a level playing field for banks competing in more than one country.70
The first of these aims reflects the purpose of the Concordat. The soundness
and stability goal actually relates to a concern that a disruption in the interna-
tional banking marketplace will in turn unsettle one or more national banking
systems and possibly entire economies.71 But the relationship that the Basle
Committee has implied between individual bank failures and a threat to the
stability of the international banking system is somewhat overdetermined.72
Although individual bank failures certainly entail costs to owners and creditors,
the demise of a single banking organization only leads to systemic problems
if depositors begin a run on other institutions without redepositing their funds
anywhere and central banks refuse to take ameliorating steps to prevent a
contraction of credit.73
The second goal of the Basle standard is to reduce international competitive
inequities due to differences in capital adequacy and other banking policies. A
uniform capital standard, such as the Basle standard, promotes competition
among national banking industries by countering subsidies that governments
provide banks in the form of underpriced deposit insurance.74
But reducing competitive inequality is still an ambiguous goal that often
reflects even more ambiguous motives. In the United States, the interest in
contributing to the international convergence of capital adequacy standards was
a response to the wave of foreign banking operations reaching the country
under the Bank Holding Company Act.7 At that time, the Federal Reserve
Board was already concerned with devising, in consultation with non-U.S.
70. Basle Committee Proposal, supra note 6, at 530 ("The Basle Committee... has, for several years,
been working to achieve a strengthening in the capital resources of international banks in order to help
strengthen the stability of the international banking system. At the same time, achieving some convergence
of capital adequacy standards in national supervisory programs has been increasingly realised to be a
desirable objective in order to remove an important source of competitive inequality .....
71. Norton, supra note 24, at 1357-58.
72. Benston, supra note 22, at 5-10.
73. Historically, most panics have resulted from the failure of a central bank to take appropriate action.
Id. at 6-7.
74. Id. at 15.
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
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banking authorities, methods for monitoring the capital position of these
institutions.76 Although the Basle member countries sincerely sought to boost
banks' financial strength and to reduce any advantages to banks in states with
lax capital requirements,77 even the U.S. Treasury has noted that "the general
issue of competitiveness, both domestic and international, is not just a matter
of capital standards, but of the entire system of laws, regulations, economic
environment, and culture" under which depositories operate. 8
In any case, the Basle standard actually defines capital very liberally so
that, under national enabling legislation, most banks should qualify without
much difficulty.7 9 (Those who still must take steps to meet the standard may
either have to issue additional subordinated debt or equity or else have to
contract their asset portfolios by limiting new lending and/or selling their
loans.80) In this respect, the "soundness and stability" goal of the Basle stan-
dard seems superfluous; moreover, the discretion that national banking authori-
ties will retain to permit various capital instruments will undermine the compet-
itive equality objective.
Although the Basle standard will not fully accomplish its two primary
objectives, the Basle experience has suggested the possibilities of international
economic policy coordination on a discrete set of issues at a time when the
limitations of joint policymaking have become increasingly apparent.81 Al-
though the Basle Committee has no power to implement changes in national
laws, domestic law and policy creation has resulted from the Basle standard.82
Thus, the actual agreement does not particularly further its declared goals.
The Basle standard has not nullified competition among national regulators and
will not. Regulators will continue to seek ways to promote the interests of their
respective industries within the Basle regime.8"
76. See Norton, supra note 24, at 1333.
77. Soft on Banks? Regulators Should Resist Pressure to Be Lenient, ECoNOMfIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at
18 [hereinafter Soft on Banks?].
78. MODERNIZING THE FINAIAL SYsTEM, supra note 9, at 11-14.
79. Lovett, supra note 31, at 1383.
80. Soft on Banks?, supra note 77.
81. See, e.g., US. Failure at G-7 Reveals the Limits of Policy Making, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30,
1991, at 1 (lamenting conflict between United States and Germany over interest-rate gap).
82. Chang, supra note 1, at 783. Member states must themselves determine whether to enact changes
in their domestic statutes. Although the proposal for a risk-based capital framework represents a move
toward facilitating international cooperation on bank supervisory matters, it would overstate the significance
of the Basle standard to suggest that it represents an agreement among national regulators not to compete.
Id. at 788. The Basle standard then constitutes only a gentlemen's agreement, which creates expectations
of and reliance upon compliance by others. Cf. Oscar Schacer, The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding
International Agreements, 71 AM. 3. INT'L L. 296, 297, 299 (1977).
83. Indeed, the Basle standard, with its accommodations for domestic regulations, validates this process
and will contribute to its effect. See, e.g., MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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2. Restrictions on Industry Access Through Regulatory Standardization
Most major banks in the United States and Europe will have little difficulty
meeting the Basle standard by 1993, and many have met it already.s To be
sure, standardization has entailed some adjustment.85 For example, the Basle
standard allows banks to include hidden reserves as capital at a fifty-five
percent discount Under past regulation in Japan, however, banks there could
include up to seventy percent of hidden reserves in the calculation of capital.86
One reason that adjustment to the Basle standard will not be especially
painful is the two-tier definition of capital. As discussed earlier, developing a
universal definition of capital became central to reaching agreement during the
Basle Committee negotiations. Each country involved had its own definition
of regulatory capital, reflecting country-specific accounting practices, banking
activities, and supervisory philosophies. (Changes in the definition of capital
can greatly affect measured capital ratios within a national banking system and
thus alter the market's perception of the financial strength of the banking
organizations in that system. 7) Consequently, a key Basle Committee accom-
plishment was the development of a definition of capital that would be uniform
across countries and yet accommodate the different financial systems affecting
each member state's banking industry. By one reading, the two-tier capital
scheme reflects this principle of flexibility within the Basle standard.88 Where-
as Tier one capital is rigidly defined, Tier two capital encompasses a variety
of instruments.89
The fact that meeting the standard will not be difficult for many banks
suggests that a hidden purpose of the Basle standard may be to restrict entrance
to the international banking industry. In this respect, the Basle standard can be
understood as accommodating the interests of current players to the detriment
of aspiring ones, making the banking market less contestable. 90
It is also interesting that international policy convergence in other are-
as-such as liquidity management or coordination of securities and banking
84. Soft on Banks?, supra note 77.
85. See, e.g., Citicorp May Sell 40% of Ambac Unit, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 26, 1991, at 10.
86. Bardos, supra note 2, at 28; Wanna Buy a Loan?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 1990, at 105; see also
Hall, supra note 3, at 212; Bank Regulation Levelling, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 12-18, 1987, at 92.
87. Bardos, supra note 2, at 28-29.
88. The U.S. role in the development of the Basle standard is illuminating. By the mid-1980's, the
United States was confronted with the fact that other major industrial countries had introduced risk-based
capital regulation. However, U.S. regulators were reluctant to raise domestic capital standards substantially
for fear of permitting foreign banks operating in America to underprice U.S. institutions. Thus, convergence
was perceived as a means of advancing U.S. regulation without undermining the competitiveness of the
American banking industry. Id. at 27.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Some studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between a concentrated market structure
and enhanced bank performance, although it is not clear that greater concentration leads to more effective
collusion among banks. R. Alton Gilbert, Bank Market Structure and Competition, 16 1. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKENG 617, 618 (1984) (literature on market concentration is inconclusive). Id. at 629.
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regulation-has not received as much attention.91 Another issue that merits
international banking policy coordination is the nature of consolidated supervi-
sion-when all entities in a financial group are subject to some degree of
prudential oversight and are covered by standards that measure the adequacy
of capital, liquidity, and management.
92
In the end, banking regulation remains a national problem, especially in
the United States. Here, foreign banks seeking to enter securities activities may
be required under banking reform to set up well-capitalized holding compa-
nies-a huge expense to meet a regulation that seems to undermine the "level
playing field" norm of the Basle regime.93
3. The Risk-Based Framework and Bank Portrolio Problems
As discussed earlier, the central principle of the Basle standard is the
assignment of lower risk weights to lower risk assets.94 The broad categories
that the Basle standard sets out were designed with a view to affording national
authorities flexibility in implementing the framework. This deference to national
authorities reflects the difference in loan quality across G-10 countries and the
discretion these authorities have to determine the risk-weighting for obligations
of certain domestic public sector entities.95
The appeal of risk asset ratios is that they provide an apparently objective
basis for risk assessment. The danger of relying upon them for supervisory
purposes is that banks' pricing and other decisions become "based on a set of
dubious risk weights and conversion factors, thereby introducing arbitrary
distortions into business development" that might actually increase overall
portfolio risk.95 The attention now given to risk weighting in the United States
is significant because it legitimates the trend toward an early intervention policy
by making capital requirements appear to be based upon actual, measurable
risk.
a. The Risk-Based Categories and Risk Measurement
Unless tightened, the current risk-weight categorization may actually
encourage risk taking, resulting in both higher credit risk and higher inter-
est-rate risk in portfolios. In particular, the Basle standard does not take ade-
91. See Quinn, supra note 42, at 236; Convergence of Capital Standards and the Lessons of the Market
Crash, supra note 58, at 221-22.
92. Christine M. Cumming & Lawrence M. Sweet, Financial Structure of the G-1O Countries: How
Does the United States Compare?, 12 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Winter 1987-88, at 14, 19.
93. Comprehensive Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 214, 215 (1991); see Japan Banks Keen to
Enter US. Securities Field, INr'L HERALD TRM., May 3, 1991, at 17.
94. Lovett, supra note 31, at 1383.
95. Id. at 1382-84.
96. Hall, supra note 3, at 216. At any rate, relying upon risk asset ratios may have an adverse effect
upon the efficiency of portfolio choice, whether or not it affects riskiness.
[Vol. 101: 15251540
Bank Regulation
quate account of variance in risk among different types of assets within the
same risk-weight category. For example, weak commercial loan credits have
the same risk-weighting as highly-rated ones. A bank may decide to forgo
high-quality commercial loans-which have a 100% risk weighting-in favor
of more risky government instruments, some of which have a weighting of
20%. In this fashion, banks can continue to chase returns at the expense of
portfolio quality.97
Moreover, the nature of commercial loan credit risk varies across countries
with different financial industry structures. Lending by Japanese long-term
credit banks-which maintain intimate, often exclusive, relationships with their
clients over decades-is fundamentally different from lending by U.S. and U.K.
institutions, which is characterized by arm's length bargaining and a muted role
for banks as agents of national competitiveness." Thus, the strength of the
Japanese commercial loan credit as described is that it is perceived to be strong
by a lender that has a substantial interest in its strength and, most importantly,
a willingness to maintain it. Moreover, assessment of lending to various sectors
of the economy is a product of how and why the loans were made. For exam-
ple, in the 1980's, the speculative bubbles in property markets emerged, in part,
because once sectoral loans were made in large quantities, the perception of
risk in that sector shifted, making credits in that sector more attractive.
In the United States, the proliferation of highly leveraged financings since
the 1980's has had significant implications for the portfolio quality and overall
risk exposure of bank participants.99 Despite this fact, highly leveraged finan-
cings are categorized with other commercial loans for the purposes of determin-
ing a bank's capital sufficiency. to Such problems cannot be solved by creat-
ing new categories, which would result in endless regulatory hair-splitting.
Another problem is that it may not be possible to assess the risk associated
with a bank's total operations merely by examining the risk of each component
activity. Portfolio theory suggests that combination of risks has a dimension
of its own; risks can affect and reinforce each other. Moreover, portfolios that
97. Chang, supra note 1, at 791.
98. See RONALD P. DORE, FLEXIBLE RIGIDITIES 66-71 (1986). Dore notes:
[A]vailability of bank credit has been of great importance for Japanese industry because such
a high proportion of the capital employed in industry comes through the banking system rather
than through the share market. ... This high gearing pattern is not as dangerous as it would
be thought to be in Europe or North America. Between the banks and their corporate customers
there are relations of trust and mutual obligations.
Id. at 67.
99. Memorandum from William Taylor, Staff Director, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each
Federal Reserve Bank (on Highly Leveraged Financings) (Feb. 16, 1989) (on file with author).
100. The Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board have declared recently
that"participation of banking organizations in highly-leveraged transactions is not considered inappropriate
so long as it is conducted in a sound and prudent manner, including the maintenance of adequate capital
and loan loss reserves to support the risks associated with these transactions." COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, FEDERAL DEPosrr INS. CORP., FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, GUIDANCE ON HIGHLY-LEVERAGED
TRANSACTIONS 1 (Feb. 15, 1991) (interagency statement, on file with author).
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are heavy with sectoral lending, and thus have a high covariance among cred-
its,1 ' run the risk of inadequate diversification.'02
But the critique that the risk asset ratio (RAR) may be neither necessary
nor sufficient to safeguard against insolvency03 probably holds less weight
than others. Although bank insolvencies have been related to mismanagement,
such phenomena are, in effect, credit risk problems. This critique of the RAR
is amplified by the fact that there clearly are other possible means of assessing
capital adequacy,1°4 as demonstrated by U.S. regulatory experience. 05
Moreover, any capital adequacy regulation assumes that the risk inherent
in bank assets can be quantified or reasonably assessed. But the Basle risk
categories are basically arbitrary and unsupported by portfolio theory.1 6
The Basle standard also measures capital according to traditional accounting
practices. Thus, certain values for untraded assets are difficult to determine. 7
In addition, accounting rules, which can vary significantly across countries,
perpetuate their own perversities. An example in the United States is that, even
under a system for mandatory regulatory intervention, bank regulators still
retain broad discretion because bank capital is measured using generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).'08 Instituting market value accounting
(MVA) could theoretically check abuses of GAAP °9
b. Limits of the Basle Standard in the United States
The Basle Committee acknowledges that there are limitations to the risk
asset ratio scheme and that bank regulators must still take into account interest-
rate and investment risk as well as overall portfolio quality."0 But what the
101. See Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.L 4, 50-52 (1976).
Modem portfolio theory (MPr) addresses this intuitive notion of the covariance of risks and the need to
select assets whose directional risks will balance each other.
102. Cf. James Tobin, The Theory of Portfolio Selection, in THE THEORY OF INTEREST RATEs 3, 22
(F.L Hahn & F.P.R. Brechling eds., 1965) (discussing goal of diversification).
103. Hall, supra note 3, at 215-17.
104. See David T. Llewellyn, The Policy Framework: CapitalAdequacy, in MANAGING BANK AssETS
AND LIABILTrIEs (JS.G. Wilson ed., 1988).
105. In the 1960's, the Comptroller of the Currency adopted a new approach to capital adequacy
regulation that went beyond mechanical formulae, discarding previous practice as arbitrary and inadequate.
Although regulators continued to use a seven-to-one assets-to-capital ratio as a guideline, the Comptroller
developed a policy of evaluating the capital adequacy of banks on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
management quality, asset quality, liquidity, earnings history, ownership strength, and cash flow abilities.
Norton, supra note 24, at 1318-19.
106. They also reflect political values, such as homeownership, in the form of the 50% risk weight
for residential mortgages. And the risk categories do not take adequate account of foreign-exchange and
interest-rate risk. Benston, supra note 22, at 19. To the extent that the Basle standard does pay lip service
to the need for analytic determination of risk categories, it only assigns assets particular risk weights based
upon a casual sense of the historical quality of various portfolio credits. See also Dybvig & Ross, supra
note 41.
107. Benston, supra note 22, at 18.
108. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 4.
109. Id. at 5.
110. See Basle Committee Proposal, supra note 6, at 110.
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banking industry in the United States needs are systemic, holistic risk-reduction
methods that address risk factors that may infect a portfolio as a whole. Undi-
versified portfolios constituted the greatest nonfraud cause of commercial bank
failure in the United States in recent years."' However, the United States still
lacks nationwide bank branching. Bank branching restrictions clearly contribut-
ed to the inability of thrifts to diversify their loans, and, in the 1980's, states
with stringent bank branching limits experienced a disproportionately high
number of bank failures.
112
If the barriers between the investment banking and commercial banking
businesses that the Glass-Steagall Act created are eradicated, the implications
of a risk-weighting approach to determine the minimum capital ratios for
institutions will be unclear.1 The question is whether a nonbank parent and
its nonbank subsidiaries should be regulated within the same framework. Bank
supervisors in most G-10 countries, including the United States, have adopted
the consolidation principle with respect to reporting requirements and assess-
ment of bank capital adequacy. 4 Consolidation usually extends to securities
and nonbanking financial activities conducted within a universal banking
framework or in affiliates.' Substantially different capital rules for the secu-
rities and commercial banking industries here may distort competitive pric-
ing.116 New relationships between these two industries will involve the securi-
ties industry assuming more credit risk and commercial banks assuming more
market and foreign exchange risk.
117
IV. CAPITAL ADEQUACY AS A BASIS FOR BANK SUPERVISION
The development of the Basle standard at the international level and the
recent adoption of the Basle rules in U.S. banking regulations have led poli-
cymakers to begin to make capital adequacy a supervisory criterion for diverse
areas of bank regulation. Under the Comprehensive Reform Act, the problems
111. Benston, supra note 22, at 20.
112. Regional economies that were adversely affected following downturns in the agricultural and
energy sectors brought their banks down with them. And although banks can diversify their assets geographi-
cally through "loan production offices," the activities of lending and deposit-taking work best together.
113. See Thomas F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber, Risk-Based CapitaIRequirements: Should They Apply
to Bank Holding Companies?, IssuEs IN BANK REG., Summer 1988, at 8. For discussion of how the
Treasury proposal would have opened broader activities to well-capitalized institutions, see infra note 136
and accompanying text. The most important new bank activities would have been in the securities industry:
(1) underwriting and wholesale marketing of securities, and (2) retail brokerage and distribution of securities
to investor families.
114. See Cumming & Sweet, supra note 92, at 19.
115. Id.
116. Capital rules in both of these industries have reflected the nature of each business-neither of
which traditionally competed directly with the other. The most important distinction is that between the
banking and securities industry time horizons, each reflecting how rapidly managers can adapt to change
and adjust their risk profiles. Haberman, supra note 35, at 1.
117. Norton, supra note 24, at 1313.
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of the Basle standard discussed earlier will extend beyond the capital adequacy
domain to distort bank supervision in general.
To be sure, there are critics who deplore the use of capital adequacy as a
tool of bank regulation;11 8 however, it is fair to say, given recent statistical
research, that although capital is an imperfect indicator of bank health it
remains a very useful one.n1 9 What critics have not emphasized to date is that
the current focus upon making capitalization a basis of broader regulation has
diverted attention from more important issues-including removing obsolete
regulatory restrictions, such as those upon interstate branching and bank
participation in securities and insurance activities-that prevent banks from
improving their commercial loan credits, overall portfolio quality, profits, and
competitiveness. Addressing these problems directly will prove politically
difficult, although the Treasury expected that capital-based regulation would
have provided a vehicle for introducing a few banking reforms, including
protecting the Bank Insurance Fund, without the need for hard political choices.
Deposit insurance was designed to bolster confidence in the banking system
in times of crisis by halting bank runs and preventing losses to small deposi-
tors. 2la But recent experience has vindicated some of the criticisms raised at
the inception of the deposit insurance system: although it has provided stability,
the federal safety net has essentially "permitted weak, poorly managed institu-
tions to stay in business too long-aggravating losses and misallocating resourc-
es to unproductive investments,"12' with healthy banks and the taxpayer
shouldering the resulting costs.12 Indeed, for the Treasury, protection of the
Bank Insurance Fund is the major impetus behind capital-based regulation.'2
118. Id. at 1314.
119. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text
120. However, in the past decade, 9 of the 10 largest Texas bank holding companies have been
reorganized with FDIC or other outside assistance. From 1987 to the end of 1990, the FDIC fund declined
from more than $18 billion to about $9 billion, forcing Congress to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund.
MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYsTEM, supra note 9, at 5; see also James Risen, US. Considers Backing
Out of FDIC Plan, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 17, 1991, at 9; US. Plan WouldAllow Fed to Lend to FDIC,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Man 20, 1991, at 9. The insurance fund's precarious state raised concerns about a
possible replay of the savings and loan fund bail-out U.S. Adds $30 Billion in S&L Bail-out Funds, INT'L
HERALD TR ., Mar 25, 1991, at 9.
121. MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 5. But see Jerry Knight & Sue Schmidt,
U.S. Considers Easing Rules for Troubled Banks, INT'L HERALD TRI., June 8-9, 199 1, at 13 (questioning
early intervention principle as insiders add up costs of closing institutions).
122. Bank insurance costs have escalated for three reasons. First, bank profits have decreased, costs
have escalated, and capital levels have declined as a result of regulatory restrictions preventing banks from
moving into new areas of business in order to serve the financial needs of their best clients. Second, taxpayer
exposure to bank losses has grown as the deposit insurance safety net has expanded, and weak banking
institutions have taken greater lending risks. Under the Treasury plan, the proposed reduced scope of deposit
insurance-limits on the amount insured per person rather than per account-would have reduced taxpayer
exposure. US. Banking Reform: Reduced Scope of Deposit Insurance Will Cut Risk to Tax-payers, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at 6. Finally, previous government efforts to impose market discipline on the banking
system have proven inadequate.
123. MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 14.
In sum, it is crucial to strengthen the role of capital in the bank regulatory system .... There
should be rewards for firms that build and maintain strong levels of capital, and prompt
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Because the Basle standard has already become part of U.S. regulations,
adherence to the Basle norms does not loom large in the current regulatory
debate; but those who sought to tighten regulatory intervention co-opted the
logic of the Basle standard-a method of risk assessment, however weak-as
a means of assessing bank health to make other regulatory decisions."
1. Capitalization as an Index of Bank Health
The technical debate in the United States, which predates the push for
capital-based regulation, has centered on problems of using reported capital as
an index of bank health. As suggested, the use of GAAP accounting results in
overreporting of bank capital at weak institutions.125 A weak bank may also
tend to sell those healthy assets that will permit it to record a gain while
carrying "underwater" assets at "inflated historical costs. ''lIA The preceding
practices were common during the 1980's, especially in the savings and loan
industry. Nevertheless, even with these flaws, reported capital provides a
meaningful basis for predicting the well-being of banks. Recent studies for the
House Banking Committee on the state of the industry and of the FDIC confirm
a correlation between capital position and the probability that a bank will
require resolution. 27 In short, although capital position is not a perfect indica-
tor of future performance, the Barth study suggests a strong statistical basis for
the need for close supervision of weakly capitalized institutions. One objection
has been that tougher capital adequacy standards will make it harder for banks
to earn an acceptable return on equity and, in turn, encourage unwarranted
risk-taking. However, at current capital levels this danger does not seem to
exist. 8 Indeed, well-capitalized banks in the United States, due to their over-
all strength, have enjoyed a higher return-on-equity and lower rates of non-
accrual loans than their weaker brethren. 129
corrective action for firms that fail to do so. There should be new opportunities for banks to
build and attract capital, and improved measurement of capital in relation to risk. Over time this
should result in a strong, well-capitalized banking system--the best protection for the tax-payer.
Id.
124. Certain Treasury proposals would have permitted well-capitalized banks to embark upon new
financial activities through a holding company structure. In order to protect the taxpayer, only the bank itself
would have had access to deposit insurance. Peter Riddell, US. Banking Reform: Support for Wider Range
of Activities, FIN. TIms, Feb. 6, 1991, at 6.
125. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 2.
126. Id.
127. JAIMES R. BARTH ET AL., BANKING INDUSTRY IN TURMOIL, REPORT TO THE FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS SUBCOMz. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 59-60 (Comm. Print 1990). This research demonstrated that banks that were weakly capitalized in 1986
were much more likely to fail during the following three years than those with a strong capital position:
whereas banks with an equity-to-asset ratio greater than 6% had only a 1-2% chance of undergoing
resolution, banks with very poor capitalization-less than 1.5%-had a 40-60% likelihood of resolution.
These calculations, based upon a sample of 13,000 banks with less than $500 million in assets, do not reflect
either risk-weighting or off-balance sheet exposures. Id.
128. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 3.
129. Id. Of course, strong capitalization may be a product of strong performance.
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2. Capital-Based Regulation Proposals
The banking reform issue in the United States has not been whether capital
should be used as an indicator of bank health, but whether it should increasing-
ly provide a basis for much of regulatory reform. Two legislative proposals
incorporated into the recently enacted Comprehensive Reform Act provided for
early regulatory intervention based upon a bank's capital position: the Treasury
Department proposal, which was a worksheet for comprehensive banking
reform,1 30 and a bill introduced by Senator Donald Riegle, S. 543.'13 Both
schemes were designed to increase supervision as a bank's capital position
deteriorated and to direct certain dividend, activity, and growth restrictions.
Most importantly, these proposals allowed an insured institution to be placed
in conservatorship before it is technically insolvent. Major differences between
the Treasury plan and S. 543 concerned (1) how to draft various levels of
capital-based regulation, (2) whether intervention is mandatory or discretionary,
(3) how the plans approach the "too big to fail" dilemma relating to troubled
institutions such as the Bank of New England, 132 and (4) whether to permit
well-capitalized institutions to engage in certain prohibited nonbanking activi-
ties 13 -a privilege ultimately not granted under the new law.
S. 543 was initially based upon only two regulatory tiers; thus, banks
falling below the minimum capital ratio would have been forced to suspend
dividend payments, limit their growth to ten times new capital, and file a capital
restoration plan.134 By contrast, the Treasury proposal envisioned a five-tier
or "zone" regulatory scheme, providing for greater flexibility to deal with banks
barely missing the capital standard. 135 Zone-1 banks, those surpassing mini-
130. Comprehensive Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 131, 133 (1991), adopts most of the
Treasury proposals for capital-based supervision except those extending broader powers to well-capitalized
banks.
131. S. 543, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991); see also Marc Levinson, Why U.S. Banks Are Hurting,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1991, at 39-41 (observing need for banking reform).
132. See Steve Lohr, Today's U.S. Banking Fear: 'Silent' Run, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 19, 1991,
at 9. An important question is whether a refusal to bail out large uninsured depositors in the case of a major
bank failure would induce a ripple effect across other potentially troubled institutions.
133. Litan Testimony, supra note 14, at 3.
134. Banks whose capital deteriorated further so as to fall below a critical capital ratio would have
had their activities restricted and payments to subordinated debtholders suspended; if not recapitalized within
30 days, these banks would have been placed in conservatorship unless the FDIC determined that another
course of action would cost less. Nevertheless, banks not regaining the critical capital ratio within a year
would have been subject to a mandatory receivership. Id. at 4.
135. Zone-2 banks, meeting minimum capital requirements, would have been permitted to expand into
these new financial businesses on a case-by-case basis. Zone-3 banks, those failing to meet minimum capital
ratios, but not by a margin meriting drastic action, would have been required to file capital restoration plans.
Regulators would have had discretion to impose growth and dividend restrictions, to direct a change in
management, and to increase supervision. Zone-4 would have included those banks falling substantially
below the minimum capital ratio; regulatory imposition of the Zone-3 restrictions would have become
mandatory for institutions in this category. Zone-5 banks would have consisted of institutions on the brink
of insolvency subject to early receivership or conservatorship. S. 543 also posed the problem of permitting
the regulator of the insurance fund to delay putting a bank with capital below the critical ratio into
conservatorship based upon the agency's assessment of future costs. Given that the FDIC has tended to
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mum capital levels, would have enjoyed broad rights to engage, through
affiliates, in what have been prohibited activities, mainly in the securities
industry, for the past sixty years.136
The decision of regulators to protect all uninsured depositors at the Bank
of New England has refocused attention upon the "too big to fail" policy
reminiscent of the run upon Continental Illinois several years ago. Although
both S. 543 and the Treasury proposal addressed this issue, neither dealt with
it effectively. S. 543 prevented the FDIC from paying off uninsured depositors
in full but still allowed lending to the troubled banks in question. The Treasury
proposal left the issue of uninsured depositor payoffs to joint Department and
Federal Reserve Bank case-by-case decisions. Although such escape valves are
key in times of crisis to prevent runs, the problem of disparate treatment of
large and small banks remains unsolved.
137
Dealing with the de facto two-tier banking system may require a dual
regulatory scheme.1 38 Such a scheme may entail higher minimum capital
ratios in each tier for banks and bank holding companies with assets above a
certain level. 9 Another answer may be to require large institutions to main-
tain a certain amount of their capital in subordinated debt14 or to obtain
reinsurance on a portion of the Bank Insurance Fund's risk.141
3. Capital-Based Regulation as Part of the Reform Solution
Capital-based regulation played a key role in the overall Treasury banking
reform proposal, which identified "interrelated parts" of the current problem
in the United States: reduced bank competitiveness and financial strength,
caused by outdated legal restrictions; the overextension of deposit insurance;
a fragmented regulatory system; and an undercapitalized deposit insurance
fund.142 (And although the Comprehensive Reform Act sidesteps the restric-
tions banks face in the securities and insurance businesses, this issue will
certainly be revisited in the near future.)
regard most alternatives to liquidation as cost effective (in the short term), the early intervention goal would
have suffered. Id. at 6-7.
136. The envisioned holding company structure would still not have permitted banks to engage in
universal banking--operating securities and traditional commercial banking businesses under one roof-as
is the frequent continental European practice.
137. Uninsured depositors at large banks typically enjoy all of the benefits of the federal insurance
fund, whereas uninsured depositors at small banks, such as Freedom National Bank in New York, typically
end up suffering losses. This controversy concerns more than simple fairness to the uninsured depositor
at small banks. Recent banking problems have not been contained to large banks but have plagued them
disproportionately. Id. at 7.
138. Many large banks have lost their best customers-corporations with strong credit ratings, often
stronger than those of the banks with which they deal-to the securities markets. Id. at 8.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Like subordinated debt, reinsurance provides a mechanism for private actors with large financial
stakes to assess banks' financial positions.
142. See MODERNIZING THE FiNANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at ix.
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The first problem stems from the obsolescence of laws originally designed
to protect U.S. banks from nonbank competitors but that now, in the wake of
key marketplace innovations, hinder bank competitiveness.14 3 For example,
due to the development of instruments such as the money market mutual fund,
banks no longer have a protected source of low cost funds.'"1 Banks have lost
their near monopoly in major commercial and consumer credit activities
because of the development of the commercial paper market and securitization
and because of competition from nonbank financial institutions.145 As a result,
banks have expanded their credit card and financial advisory operations, offered
high interest to depositors, underpriced loans, and reached for riskier cred-
its. 146 A related impediment to industry strength has been that banks have
been prevented from achieving geographic diversification in their portfolios due
to restrictions on interstate banking. Although some barriers have been substan-
tially eliminated, the continued prohibitions against interstate branching denies
banks an efficient vehicle for expansion.147 The expansion of deposit insur-
ance fourfold in real terms since the 1930's-from $2500 to $100,000 per ac-
count-has only exacerbated these trends. In addition, bank regulation has
deteriorated through effectively weaker capital adequacy controls, the obsoles-
cence of flat-rate deposit insurance pricing, and lax supervisory intervention.
Part of the problem stems from competition among the regulatory agencies
overseeing the banking industry,'48 which undermines consistency and ac-
countability. 149
The final element of banking crisis has grown out of the preceding prob-
lems: the system of deposit insurance leads to excessive taxpayer exposure. But
the Comprehensive Reform Act only addresses this last problem by ignoring
the other ones. The Treasury had pushed-although certainly not as hard as it
could have in the final struggle-four reforms: (1) restoring competitiveness
by allowing banks to participate in the full range of financial services; (2)
strengthening the role of capital, reducing insurance coverage, and assessing
143. See infra note 149; see also Levinson, supra note 131, at 39-40.
144. Levinson, supra note 131, at 39-40.
145. See MODERNZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 6.
146. One outcome has been poor earnings and, thus, a drop in industry capital. Id. at 6-7.
147. Id. at 7.
148. The Federal Reserve Board has jurisdiction over the slowly shrinking numbers of bank members
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 241-250 (1988), and bank holding
companies, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises national banks. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42
(1988 & Supp. I 1990). The FDIC has authority over insured state banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
149. See Too Many Referees, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 1990, at 97 ("How the deposit-insurance scheme
is put to rights-whether it is patched up, rebuilt or replaced-matters greatly because it is the back-door
way to mending the whole of America's financial system.").
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risk-based premiums;15 (3) streamlining the regulatory system; and (4) recapi-
talizing the Bank Insurance Fund.15'
Ironically, certain new legal provisions could actually undermine the Basle
"level playing field" principle. For example, some Japanese banks are consider-
ing expanding into the U.S. securities business. 152 However, the new law may
require some foreign banks to set up well-capitalized holding companies
here,153 at considerable expense, rather than opening subsidiaries and branches
directly under their parent companies. Thus, the back door to resolving the
struggle over expanded bank powers may be the desire to increase regulation
of foreign banking institutions operating on U.S. soil.
V. CONCLUSION
The need for improved bank regulation in this country to address credit risk
and to improve the competitiveness of American institutions is clear.54 Be-
cause capital ratios provide regulators with a "hard" standard against which to
judge bank performance, it has been attractive to design schemes of regulatory
intervention around changes in banks' capital positions. The question is whether
the current U.S. scheme for early intervention based upon the capital positions
of banks is the right medicine. Appropriating the mechanics of the Basle
standard to address national bank regulation issues will probably succeed in
raising capital levels of institutions in this country, despite the theoretical
shortcomings of the risk asset ratio scheme, but accomplish little more. Capi-
tal-based regulation will probably not alleviate current banking problems and
has not been successful in reconciling the relationship between banking and
non-banking financial businesses.
150. See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYsTEM, supra note 9, at 32.
151. See id. at x-xii.
152. Japan Banks Keen to Enter U.S. Securities Field, supra note 93.
153. Comprehensive Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242 §§ 214, 215 (1991).
154. Regardless of the immediate future of banking reform, the U.S. banking system will be decidedly
more atomistic than any other for some time to come, encompassing thousands of institutions that have
divergent interests. The consequence is that one internationally important monetary policy continues to
experience the severe constraints of the structure of its domestic banking system. Hundreds and thousands
of independent financial decisionmakers make it impossible for monetary authorities to communicate with
them except through the incentives and penalties of the price mechanism (setting interest rates). Monetary
authorities cannot exercise clubby moral suasion, and this constraint can generate conflict between
international requirements for monetary policy and those imposed by moral hazard at home (keeping troubled
banks afloat), leading to fragility of the financial structure. Cf. Franco Modigliani's comments on A.M.
Wojnilower, The Central Role of Credit Crunches in Recent Financial History, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERs ON
ECONOMIC Acnvrrv 334 (1980) ("[Plast credit crunches led to deregulation which, on the whole, made
the system even more difficult to control, thus requiring further crunches that led to more deregulation and
so on."). An atomistic banking system is bound to contain a relatively high proportion of regionally and
sectionally exposed institutions, which, in turn, leads to political pressures constraining a monetary policy
that must accommodate international realities.
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